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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES R. McPHIE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden of 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
9163 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PRELIMINARY STATEME.NT 
On April 19, 1960, the Supreme Court reversed the 
ruling of the Third Judicial District Court which denied 
plaintiff McPhie's petition for habeas corpus. This 
Court remanded the case to the District Court for such 
further proceedings as are "deemed advisable and not 
inconsistent with this opinion." 
Respondent believes this decision to be of grave 
and far reaching consequence and therefore petitions the 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
·· McPhie was sentenced to prison on conviction of is-
suing a fictitious check February 7, 1958, with execution 
of sentence delayed to April 18, 1958, then thrice suc-
cessively to January 9, 1959, at which time the District 
Court committed defendant without hearing, no good 
cause appearing to it for a further stay. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
McPHIE WAS NOT GRANTED PROBATION DURING 
GOOD BEHAVIOR, NOR WAS HE ACTUALLY PUT ON 
PROBATION AT ALL, EVEN THOUGH 'TEMPORARILY 
PLACED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE PAROLE 
AND PROBATION DEPARTMENT. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE HOLDING 
OF DEMMICK V. HARRIS, WHICH ·COVERS THE INSTANT 
CASE. 
POINT III. 
THE DECISION DOES NOT ·CLEARLY INDICATE THE 
CURRENT STATUS OF DEFENDANT McPHIE. 
POINT IV. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES WILL NOW BE FORCED 
TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT TO PUT DEFEND-
ANTS ON PROBATION WITHOUT ADEQUATE TIME FOR 
EXAMINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES. 
POINT V. 
IN EFFECT, A DEFENDANT NOW WILL HAVE TO 
BE FOUND TO HAVE ·COMMITTED TWO VIOLATIONS IN 
ORDER TO BE IMPRISONED. 
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POINT Vl. 




McPHIE WAS NOT GRANTED PROBATION DURING 
GOOD BEHAVIOR, NOR WAS HE ACTUALLY PUT ON 
PROBATION AT ALL, EVEN THOUGH TEMPORARILY 
PLACED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE PAROLE 
AND PROBATION DEPARTMENT. 
:.McPhie was never given probation during good be-
havior. Therefore, he does not qualify under the holding 
of the leading case, State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 
Pac. 104-±, 54 LRA 1463. That case, Respondent respect-
fully submits, should not have been relied upon by the 
Court in arriving at its decision in Baine v. Beckstead, 
------Utah ______ , 347 P.2d 554, upon which, in turn, the Court 
seems to base its decision in the instant case. 
In Zolantakis, the petitioner actually was placed on 
probation during good behavior and his stay was revoked. 
It did not expire. Here, on the contrary, the Respondent 
has been unable to find anything in the record or minute 
entries which even suggests such status was conferred 
upon McPhie, nor was he committed until the actual ex-
piration, by its own terms, of the extended stay date. 
We submit that the actual order of the Court should be 
the controlling factor in determining whether a proba-
tionary status was granted, and in the absence of an 
order no such status should be assumed. 
It was only a normal and proper thing furthermore, 
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for the Judge to have the probation depart1nent assume 
some supervisory control over the defendant. The court 
said in the case of Demmick v. Harris, 107 Utah 471, 155 
P.2d 170: 
"Nor do we see anything in1proper in the 
court's action in this case in requiring compliance 
with conditions usually imposed on those placed 
on probation during good behavior as a condition 
to keeping in force a stay order until the date of 
its expiration." 
POINT II. 
THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE HOLDING 
OF DEMMICK V. HARRIS, WHICH ·COVERS THE INSTANT 
CASE. 
The decision made no reference whatsoever to the 
holding in DemmiJck v. Harris (citation .above) quoted ex-
tensively in appellant's brief. The Court, in Demmick, 
held: 
"But here we are met by respondent's con-
tention that the use of the writ of habeas corpus 
is restricted to the correction of jurisdictional 
errors and errors so gross as in effect to deprive 
one of constitutional substantive or procedural 
rights. Thompson v. Harris, 107 Utah 99, 152 P. 
2d 91, opinion on petition for rehearing. We shall 
assume for the purposes of this case that it would 
constitute such deprivation of appellant's rights, 
if Judge Ellett on November 28, the date of sen-
tence, placed appellant on probation during good 
behavior; and, thereafter revoked such order with-
out notice and hearing. 
Furthermore, we shall assume-and the prop-
osition must be conceded-that the 1nere summary 
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summoning of one on probation to the chambers 
of the sentencing judge to be there cross-examined 
concerning his conduct either before or after the 
order granting probation, would fall short of ac-
cording him the hearing the law prescribes. The 
primary question, therefore, is: Was appellant, 
on the date of sentence, granted an indefinite stay 
of execution and placed on probation during good 
behavior. 
The question must be answered in the nega-
tive. The order, itself, specifically makes the stay 
one until a definite time. * * * 
Whether one convicted of crime, and subject 
to punishment therefor, should be placed on pro-
bation is a matter in such court's discretion. It 
would be but salutary procedure: in the exercise 
of such discretion for a trial judge who is doubtful 
whether the granting of probation during good be-
havior is compatible with the public interest, to 
make such investigation as his judgment dictates 
as to the attitudes of the person convicted. ***" 
The essential facts here are the same as in the Demmick 
case, and the legal reasoning applied to them by the court 
there applies here also. 
POINT III. 
THE DECISION DOES NOT ·CLEARLY INDICATE THE 
CURRENT STATUS OF DEFENDANT McPHIE. 
In its decision the Court has given no guidance to 
the District Court as to McPhie's current status. In the 
eyes of the law : 
Is he on probation, or is he completely free~ 
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If he is oii probation, is it probation during good 
behavior~ 
May the Court now hold a hearing to determine 
whether or not his probation should be revoked and he be 
committed~ 
There may be other in1nates in the Staee Prison 
whose circun1stances parallel those of :McPhie. Thus, if 
these must now he released upon petition, with no strings 
attached, especially if they are beyond the right of the 
courts to recommit them for violation of probation, the 
result may well prove disastrous. 
These questions are vital and Respondent respect-
fully submits that they should be answered by the Su-
preme Court in order that the district courts might not 
be at a loss as to what, if anything, they may now do 
with defendants. 
POINT IV. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES WILL NOW BE FORCED 
TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT TO PUT DEFEND-
ANTS ON PROBATION WITHOUT ADEQUATE TIME FOR 
EXAMINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES. 
While Respondent agrees with the opinion of this 
Court to the effect that District Court Judges are men 
of undisputed integrity, cmnpletely loyal to their oath of 
office, still Respondent believes that the majority deci-
sion has so limited the Court's discretion as to make 
irnpossible an adequate investigation of whether a 
person should be placed on probation or not. The Court 
used as a reasonable measurement of time "a week or so." 
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It is not clear how much more time a judge might have in 
which to 1nake an investigation even where he expresses 
that intention at the time of granting a stay to a date 
certain. 
Thus, judges may now feel it necessary in the best 
interests of the public, where no adequate examination 
can be made, to commit persons convicted of crimes 
immediately without taking a chance that they might not 
properly commit them at all. 
POINT V. 
IN EFFECT, A DEFENDANT NOW WILL HAVE TO 
BE FOUND TO HAVE ·COMMITTED TWO VIOLATIONS IN 
ORDER TO BE IMPRISONED. 
In effect, the Court must now find the defendant has 
committed two violations before he can be imprisoned, 
unless the commitment is made in the original instance 
or within whatever short additional time may be allowed 
under the present decision. Such person first would be 
convicted of the main charge, then he would have to be 
granted a hearing to determine whether or not he violated 
the terms of his supposed "probation during good be-
havior" before he could be committed. This is a result 
never contemplated by the Legislature in enacting its 
criminal procedural statutes. 
POINT VI. 
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Our statute, 77-35-17, U.C.A. 1953, provides in part 
as follows: 
"Upon a piea of guilty or conviction of any 
crime or offense, if it appears compatible with the 
public interest, the court having jurisdiction may 
suspend the imposition or the executvon of sen-
tence and may place the defendant on probation 
for .such period of time as the court shall deter-
mine." (Emphasis added). 
The reasonable meaning of the statute would seem 
to be that the judge may suspend execution of the sen-
tence to any date he may name, with or without placing 
defendant on probation, and that the date he sets is con-
trolling without resort to further hearing. The Court has 
not seen fit to so conclude, however. 
Respondent submits, furthermore, that the Court, 
through judicial legislation, has added a limitation (pre-
commitment hearings) not contemplated by the Legisla-
ture, and has impressed upon it the conclusive stamp of 
constitutional due process. 
It having done so, the field has been closed to the 
Legislature and it may forever be denied the opportunity 
of amending the statute to correct the situation. 
The next portion of the above quoted section says: 
"The Court 1nay subsequently increase or de-
crease the probation period, and may revoke or 
modify any condition of probation." 
So, even if l\IcPhie was on probation, the judge had the 
right to revoke it, according to the statute. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent earnestly asks the Court to grant a 
rehearing for the reasons raised above because of the 
serious consequences the decision portends. 
Dated this 6th day of May, 1960. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
